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Torts-WRONGFUL DEATH-A CHILD Is NOT BORN ALIVE UNTIL
HE OR SHE ACQUIRES AN EXISTENCE SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT
FROM THE MOTHER-Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978).
On March 20, 1972, Shirley J. Duncan was admitted to St. Jo-
seph's Hospital for the birth of her fourth child.' Dr. Flynn, who
had cared for Mrs. Duncan during this and previous pregnancies,
induced labor. Shortly after she was taken into the delivery room
the baby's head emerged, but the baby's shoulders were so wide
that the infant remained lodged in the birth canal. After unsuc-
cessful attempts at various procedures for approximately twenty
minutes, the attending physicians discovered that the infant's
heart had stopped and concluded that the child could not be born
alive. At this point the physicians directed their efforts towards
protecting the mother's life. After receiving the husband's permis-
sion, they decapitated the infant, and extracted the remainder of
the body by Caesarean section.2 The death certificate cited as the
cause of death, "cardiovascular failure due to or as a consequence
of strangulation."3
As administrator of the infant's estate, the father sued the phy-
sician, hospital, and their insurers for the child's death under Flor-
ida's Wrongful Death Act.' Section 768.01 of the Act provided a
cause of action whenever the death of any person "in this state
shall be caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or de-
fault of any individual . . .," whereas section 768.03 provided a
cause of action where the death of any minor child is caused by
the wrongful act of another. 6 Plaintiff alleged that the defendant's
negligent failure to recognize in advance that a Caesarean section
would be required was the cause of the baby's death during the
birth process.7 On this basis, plaintiff set forth two main lines of
argument. First, plaintiff argued that a living baby which has par-
tially emerged, but which dies during the birth process due to neg-
1. Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 1978), aff'g 342 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1977).
2. Id.
3. Id. The plaintiff argued that the stated cause of death (i.e. strangulation) gave rise to
an inference of breathing by the child and that this was consistent with a live birth having
occurred. 342 So. 2d at 124.
4. 342 So. 2d at 123. Plaintiff's complaint was brought under Florida's former Wrongful
Death Act, ch. 72-35, 1972 Fla. Laws 174, as death occurred prior to July 1, 1972, the effec-
tive date of Florida's new act, FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1979).
5. Ch. 53-28280, § 1, 1953 Fla. Laws 934 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.19 (1979)).
6. Ch. 13-6487, § 1, 1913 Fla. Laws 300 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 768.20-.21
(1979)).
7. 358 So. 2d at 179.
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ligence, is born alive, so as to give rise to a cause of action for the
baby's wrongful death either as a person or as a minor child.8 Sec-
ond, plaintiff argued that the issue of live birth, vel non, is moot,
because a viable fetus, although unborn, is a person on whose be-
half suit is maintainable. 9 Rejecting these contentions the trial
court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 10 The
Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion, and the Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari.11
As to the plaintiff's first point, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted the reasoning and holding of the Second District Court of
Appeal. The court stated that its interpretation of when a live
birth occurs is generally consistent with the legislature's definition
of "live birth" under the vital statistics law. 2 The court noted that
the Second District had held that a child is not born alive until he
or she acquires an existence separate and independent from the
mother.13 In the district court's view, two elements are necessary to
establish a separate and independent existence, and thereby estab-
lish a case of live birth. These are: (1) evidence of explusion (or in
Caesarean section, complete removal) of the child's body from its
mother; and (2) evidence that the umbilical cord had been cut and
that the infant had an independent circulation of blood."' As a cor-
ollary to the second of these two elements, the district court stated
that expert medical evidence might be required to determine
whether an independent circulation of blood had been attained
prior to death when death occurred before the unbilicus was sev-
8. Brief of Petitioner, on Merits, in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7,
Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978).
9. Id. at 13. Plaintiff also argued that the unborn viable fetus was a minor child within
the meaning of § 768.03. This argument was foreclosed by the decision of the supreme court
in Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968). A viable fetus is one suffi-
ciently developed to live outside the womb. Id. at 697.
10. 358 So. 2d at 178.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 179. The vital statistics statute defined fetal death. Ch. 67-312, § 1, 1967 Fla.
Laws 1018 states:
(1) Fetal death is death prior to the complete expulsion or extraction from its
mother of a product of conception, if the twentieth week of gestation has been
reached; the death is indicated by the fact that after such separation, the fetus
does not breathe or show any other evidence of life such as beating of the heart,
pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles.
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 382.071 (1979)).
In fact, the statute is inapplicable to the Second District's definition of live birth since it
is concerned with fetal death rather than fetal life.
13. 358 So. 2d at 179.
14. 342 So. 2d at 126.
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ered.15 The factor of respiration did not enter into the Second Dis-
trict's definition of a separate and independent existence. 16 On the
second issue, regarding the status of a fetus under the Wrongful
Death Act, the Florida Supreme Court found dispositive its recent
holding in Stern v. Miller,17 that an unborn viable fetus is not a
person within the meaning of Florida's new Wrongful Death Act.18
The purpose of this note is to examine the standard adopted by
the Florida Supreme Court in Duncan v. Flynn's in light of other
decisions defining the moment at which live birth occurs in crimi-
nal, property, and tort law. This note will also review the medical
factors involved in the determination of live birth and will analyze
their relationship to the holding of the Second District.
In the criminal context, the Second District found support in
many cases for the proposition that complete explusion is neces-
sary in order for birth to be complete. The first case examined was
Rex v. Ann Poulton,20 an English case decided in 1832. In that
case, the mother of an infant was charged with the murder of her
child.2 1 The child was found dead and there was evidence that it
had been strangled, but it was not clear whether death occurred
before or after birth had been completed. The court began its sum-
mation to the jury by stating that a child must be born alive before
a murder conviction is possible. In the court's opinion, live birth
required the whole body to be brought alive into the world.2 As
noted by the Second District, this English view was generally fol-
lowed in the early American cases.23 By way of example, the court
15. Id.
16. 358 So. 2d at 178.
17. 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977). This case was decided after the court granted certiorari,
mooting the petitioner's arguments on this point.
18. 358 So. 2d at 178 n.3. The supreme court noted:
Although in Stern the issue was presented in the context of our current Wrongful
Death Act, §§ 768.16-.27, Fla. Stat. (1975), we expressly recognize that "[s]ince the
legislature did not materially change the language of the prior section, it must be
presumed that the legislature intended to carry forward into the new section the
terms 'person' and 'minor child' as previously construed." 348 So. 2d at 307. Thus,
it is clear that our decision in Stern interpreting the scope of the term "person" as
used in the new Wrongful Death Act applies with equal force to the identical term
as it appeared in the old Wrongful Death Act.
Id.
19. 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978).
20. 172 Eng. Rep. 997 (1832).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 998.
23. 342 So. 2d at 125.
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cited Wallace v. State, a Texas case decided in 1881. In Wallace,
the court held that live birth required the child be completely ex-
pelled alive from its mother's body.2 5 In that case, the court re-
versed a conviction of infanticide because it was not shown in the
facts that the infant was completely expelled before strangulation
occurred.26
Additionally, the Second District cited People v. Hayner,7 a
more recent case supporting the complete expulsion view. The de-
fendant in Hayner was charged with the murder of his fourteen
year old daughter's illegitimate baby. In Hayner, the New York
Court of Appeals stated two requirements for live birth. First, the
child must be completely expelled from the mother's body; and
second, the child must be possessed of, or capable of, existence by
means of a circulation independent of the mother's.2 8
The Second District stated that the prevailing view still requires
complete explusion, but it noted that recent cases have concluded
that no live birth has occurred until the child has attained a "sepa-
rate and independent existence."' 29 The definition of a separate and
independent existence presented an area of uncertainty to the Sec-
ond District.3" Ultimately, however, the court cited several cases in
support of the proposition that, in addition to complete expulsion,
an "independent circulation" of blood, and not simply breathing,
must be shown in order to prove that the child acquired a separate
24. 10 Tex. Crim. App. 255 (1881).
25. Id. at 270.
26. Id.
27. 90 N.E.2d 23 (N.Y. 1949).
28. Id. at 24.
29. 342 So. 2d at 125.
30. Id. With respect to the uncertainty, the Second District commented that it was not
always clear whether the reviewed cases were setting forth actual elements of proof to be
shown in addition to the showing of a separate and independent existence, or whether they
were only trying to explain what such an existence means physically. Id. at 124-26. The
district court noted a split of opinion as to whether a newborn still attached to its mother
by the umbilical cord may be said to possess a separate and independent existence. Id. at
126. The Second District Court of Appeal offered no support for the emphasis it placed on
this factor. Justice Karl, writing for the dissent in the supreme court opinion, however, ob-
jected strenuously to the adoption of any absolute rule of law fixing the occurrence of live
birth on the severing of the umbilical cord. 348 So. 2d at 180. Justice Karl's viewpoint is not
unprecedented; as stated by the court in Goff v. Anderson, to make a child's legal existence
"date from the time a physician may in his wisdom see proper to cut the navel cord is
without reason .. " 15 S.W. 866, 867 (Ky. 1891). In fact, however, the standard of the
Second District does not absolutely require that the umbilical cord be cut, as independent
circulation may also be proven through the use of expert testimony. 342 So. 2d at 126. Jus-
tice Karl further contended that whether or not an infant had been born alive should be a
question of fact for the jury. 358 So. 2d at 180.
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and independent existence. 1
The other criminal cases cited by the Second District are not as
directly supportive of its holding. The cases agree that breathing
alone is insufficient to establish live birth, and that a separate and
independent existence, in addition to expulsion, must be attained.
They disagree, however, on the exact criteria to be used in the defi-
nition of independent existence. For example, in Jackson v. Com-
monwealth,3 2 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that it was neces-
sary for the prosecution to prove both that the child breathed, and
that it had a complete and separate existence of its own after
birth, in order to establish the corpus delicti in a homicide. The
court stated that being born means that the whole body is brought
into the world, but it did not otherwise define a "complete and
separate" existence." In addition, the court held that it would be
murder to kill a child completely expelled from the mother's body,
but still connected by the umbilical cord.3 This demonstrates that
the umbilical connection was no barrier in finding a complete and
separate existence; to this extent, Jackson is contrary to the rule
set forth by the Second District.35 Similarly, in Montgomery v.
State,3 6 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a child must attain a
separate and independent existence after being born alive in order
to sustain a conviction for its murder. In addition, the court held
that a physician's testimony that the infant had breathed before
its throat was cut did not prove a separate and independent exis-
tence, because the physician was unable to provide corroborating
evidence that the child's heart had beat after complete expulsion.87
The court found the physician's testimony to be consistent with
the theory that the child was born dead. 8 Evidence of a heartbeat
is a criterion of complete and separate existence not required by
the definition adopted by the Second District.
The law dealing with live birth in criminal prosecutions has, in
general, followed the course outlined by the Second District Court
of Appeal. The earliest English cases required complete separation
from the mother and also independent circulation, neither of
31. 342 So. 2d at 125. See, e.g., Poulton, 172 Eng. Rep. at 997.
32. 96 S.W.2d 1014, 1014 (Ky. 1936).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 342 So. 2d at 126.
36. 44 S.E.2d 242, 243 (Ga. 1947).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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which was proved nor disproved by the presence or absence of
breathing.3 9 In a later case, an English court clarified the meaning
of the crucial terms, "complete separation" and "independent cir-
culation." That court held that expulsion from the mother's body
without severance of the umbilical cord was sufficient proof of
complete separation. 0 In addition, the court held that independent
circulation was proven .by medical testimony that the child had
breathed following complete expulsion.41
These presumptions were successfully applied in only a few
cases, since the secrecy surrounding such births often made proof
difficult."2 In 1929 these difficulties in proof prompted Parliament
to enact The Infant Life (Preservation) Act.43 The Act imposed a
maximum punishment of life imprisonment for the willful destruc-
tion of a fetus over twenty-eight weeks old. The Act allowed the
courts to avoid the issue of live birth by utilizing a charge for
which proof of live birth was unnecessary. 45
A few American jurisdictions, including Florida, have followed
the English approach and enacted feticide statutes.46 In general,
however, the law pertaining to infanticide has developed in a more
complex fashion in this country. At the end of the last century,
there was no authoritative view with respect to the legal signifi-
cance of independent circulation and the necessity of breathing.47
By the middle of the twentieth century, however, a majority and a
minority view were firmly established in the criminal law area.4 8
The majority view adopts in main part the old English doctrine,
insisting generally upon complete expulsion and proof of indepen-
dent circulation in order to establish live birth.49 The minority
view rejects the necessity of proving live birth at all in infanticide
39. See, e.g., Poulton, 172 Eng. Rep. 997 (1832). For a discussion of the early English
cases, see Meldman, Legal Concepts of Human Life: The Infanticide Doctrine, 52 MARQ. L.
REV. 105, 106 (1968). Proof of live birth was generally held to be necessary to prove the
corpus delicti of the crime, for unless the subject of the alleged crime was a living person
there could be no murder and therefore no murderer. 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 312(f) (1944).
40. Regina v. Trilloe, 174 Eng. Rep. 674 (1842).
41. Id.
42. Meldman, supra note 39, at 107.
43. 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34. See Meldman, supra note 39, at 105-06; Note, Killing an
Unborn but Viable Fetus Is Not Murder Under Section 187 of the California Penal Code,
22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 828, 830 (1971).
44. 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 782.09 (1979); Miss. CODE ANN. 97-3-37 (1972).
47. See Meldman, supra note 39, at 108.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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prosecutions, stating that there is no substantial distinction be-
tween a viable prenatal infant and a newly born one.50
A majority of American jurisdictions have accepted independent
circulation, in addition to complete expulsion, as a necessary con-
comitant of live birth. In criminal cases, however, the criteria by
which independent circulation can be proved have remained un-
clear.51 In contrast to the rule developed by the Second District,
respiration has generally been considered one indicator of an inde-
pendent circulation, though it is almost always considered incon-
clusive when taken alone.52 In Morgan v. State,53 the Supreme
Court of Tennessee even went to the extreme of stating that the
existence of respiration establishes both an independent circula-
tion and an independent existence. In Hayner, however, the New
York court rejected breathing alone as a reliable indicator of inde-
pendent circulation." And the Kentucky court in Jackson confuses
the relationship between breathing and independent circulation
even further by requiring both as separate elements of proof in or-
der to establish live birth.55
Unfortunately, the confusion resulting from the attempts to in-
corporate evidence of respiration into the legal definition of live
birth has continued in other jurisdictions. Many courts have
turned to other factors in order to make the live birth determina-
tion." Some courts, as in Montgomery v. State,57 have relied
mainly on the opinion of medical experts as to whether or not the
child was born alive. Other courts, as in Hayner, have held that
medical opinion as to live birth is of only slight or conjectural sig-
50. Id. at 111.
51. Id. at 109.
52. Id. See also Annot., 159 A.L.R. 523, 527 (1945). Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo.
1963), was one of the cases offered by the plaintiff in support of his argument that the child
was born alive. 342 So. 2d at 124. In Bennett, a mother was tried for the death of her
newborn infant. The Wyoming Supreme Court allowed evidence of breathing to be
presented by the prosecution while it avoided ruling on its probative value. 377 P.2d at 636.
The court held that whether or not live birth had occurred was a question of fact for the
jury. Id. Therefore, the court held it was proper for the court to receive the expert opinion
of the autopsy physician. His opinion was that the child was born alive. Id. The physician's
report was supported by evidence that the child had breathed, and he stated that this was
the most reliable indicaton of live birth. Id. at 635.
53. 256 S.W. 433 (Tenn. 1923).
54. 90 N.E.2d at 25.
55. 96 S.W.2d at 1014.
56. Meldman, supra note 39, at 110.
57. 44 S.E.2d at 244. See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 78 S.E. 699 (W. Va. 1913) (physician's
testimony that it was impossible to tell whether infant was alive when strangulation took
place, but there was sufficient evidence to establish a live birth).
19801
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nificance." In State v. Osmus," the Wyoming Supreme Court con-
sidered another criterion in establishing live birth. In that case, the
expert witness testified that the umbilical cord is not usually cut
until after pulsation ceases. On this basis, the court held that one
medical criterion of independent circulation was the cessation of
pulse, because this indicated that the infant had stopped transfer-
ring blood into the placenta for oxygenation." As pointed out by
the Iowa Supreme Court, however, this one event might just as
easily be caused by the death of the infant, in which case the court
might mistake a sign of death as one of life.6"
People v. Chavez62 is the leading authority among the minority
of American courts that have rejected the necessity of showing live
birth in infanticide prosecutions. In Chavez, a mother was charged
with manslaughter for negligently allowing her newborn to bleed to
death after cutting the umbilical cord. The defendant contended
on appeal that there was not enough evidence of the traditional
requirements of live birth to sustain the conviction.' After review-
ing the holdings of various courts in this area, the California court
rejected the traditional rules, stating that the difficult factual ques-
tions of infanticide should be met and decided on the basis of
whether or not a living baby with the natural potential for growth
and development is being born.a The California Supreme Court
approved the holding of the court in Chavez, stating that a viable
fetus in the process of being born is a human being within the
meaning of the California homicide statutes.66 The holding in Cha-
vez has subsequently been relied on to make a strong presumption
in favor of live birth. 7
In our noted case, the Second District Court of Appeal cited two
cases in the area of property law in support of its conclusions. In
Goff v. Anderson,6" a husband's right as tenant by curtesy in his
58. 90 N.E.2d at 25. Cf. Shedd v. State, 173 S.E. 847 (Ga. 1934) (unsupported testimony
of physician based on post-mortem examination does not establish guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt).
59. 276 P.2d 469 (Wyo. 1954).
60. Id. at 476.
61. Wehrman v. Farmers' and Merchants' Say. Bank, 259 N.W. 564, 569 (Iowa 1935).
62. 176 P.2d 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
63. Id. at 93.
64. Id. at 94.
65. Id.
66. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 629 (Cal. 1970).
67. Id. See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 35 So. 375 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948); State v. Shephard,
124 N.W.2d 712 (Iowa 1964).
68. 15 S.W. 866 (Ky. 1891).
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wife's land was contingent on live issue produced by the marriage.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that "a child is completely
born when delivered, or expelled from and becomes external of the
mother, whether the placenta has been separated or the cord cut
or not, . . . and, if not at that instant dead, it is to be regarded as
born alive for every legal purpose whatever."6 9 The Second District
found additional support for its conclusion that expulsion is neces-
sary in the more recent case of Wehrman v. Farmers' &
Merchants' Savings Bank.70 In Wehrman, the Iowa Supreme
Court stated that the functioning of the heart after delivery, estab-
lishing an independent circulation of blood, was the criterion by
which the existence of an infant as a human being could be estab-
lished.7 1 After noting that no attempt to find a heartbeat had been
made, however, the court in Wehrman established a presumption
that the twins lived long enough to survive their mother absent
evidence by the defendant to the contrary.72 The decision of the
court in Goff lends direct support to the conclusions of the Second
District. The holding of the Iowa court in Wehrman, however, is
not as strong a precedent. Wehrman, while adopting a standard
seemingly akin to that used in murder prosecutions, actually cre-
ated a presumption of live birth in the face of evidence tending to
show that the children were born dead.7 3
Under the common law, the property rights of an unborn child
are recognized from the moment of conception.74 This view con-
templates, however, that the actual vesting of the rights will not
occur until the child is born alive. The Florida Supreme Court
adopted the common law rule in a case involving an unborn child's
right to inherit homestead property.76 In that case, the court stated
that "posthumous children inherit in all cases in like manner as if
they were born in the lifetime of the intestate and had survived
him. 7 6 This view has retained general support among other
jurisdictions.77
69. Id. at 866 (emphasis in original).
70. 259 N.W. 564 (Iowa 1935).
71. Id. at 571.
72. Id. at 569.
73. See id. at 564.
74. Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46
NOTRE DAME LAW. 349, 354 (1971). See, e.g., Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695,
700 (Fla. 1968).
75. Shone v. BelIlmore, 78 So. 605 (Fla. 1918).
76. Id. at 607 (citing 4 J. KENT'S COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 412 (13th ed.)).
77. Note, supra note 74, at 353. The American law with regard to the property rights of
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The Second District cited only one case in the area of tort law in
support of its holding. In the California case of Justus v. Atchi-
son,78 the plaintiff argued that Chavez was support for his conten-
tion that a viable child in the process of being born was a human
being for whose death a wrongful death pction could be brought.
The lower court recognized that Chavez supported the argument
advanced by the plaintiff, but it pointed out that the Chavez deci-
sion was made in the context of a homicide prosecution and there-
fore was distinguishable. 9 On appeal, the California Supreme
Court ruled that a baby who died during the process of a delivery
or an assisted birth was born dead for purposes of a tort suit and
that an action for wrongful death could not be maintained on the
child's behalf."0
The law governing the general area of prenatal torts has under-
gone rapid change in the past thirty years.8 " Although the wrongful
death action on behalf of infants and adults has long been ac-
cepted, 2 in early cases, recovery in tort was not allowed for any
injury inflicted upon the prenatal infant, regardless of whether the
infant was subsequently stillborn or born alive. A majority of
courts have expanded tort liability to include recovery for negli-
gently inflicted prenatal injuries if the child is subsequently born
alive,"' and most courts will now allow the use of a wrongful death
action to maintain a suit where an infant is stillborn.8 4
the unborn was summed up by the court in In re Holthausen's Will, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Surr.
Ct. 1941). In that case, the court stated that it had been the uniform and unvarying decision
of all common law courts with respect to estate matters that an unborn child is "born" and
"alive." Id. at 143.
78. 126 Cal. Rptr. 150, 155 (Ct. App. 1975), affd, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977).
79. 126 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
80. 565 P.2d at 132-33.
81. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 55, at 335-36 (4th ed. 1971). See
generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, 1226-28 (1971); Note, A Stillborn Fetus May Not Be
Included Within the Meaning of a Statute Permitting Recovery for the Wrongful Death of
a Minor Child, 18 DRAKE L. REV. 310 (1969).
82. Rose, Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death, 33 MICH. L. REV. 545,
545 (1935).
83. Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d at 1228. See generally Note, supra note 81, at 312-13; Annot., 15
A.L.R.3d 992 (1967).
84. See Note, supra note 81, at 312-13. See also Note, California's Response for Wrong-
ful Death of a Stillborn Fetus: Justus v. Atchison, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 589, 597 (1978).
Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that this is not a violation
of the stillborn infant's constitutional rights. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that
"the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."
410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (footnote omitted). See generally Note, Wrongful Death and the
Unborn: An Examination of Recovery after Roe v. Wade, 13 J. FAM. L. 99 (1973-74); An-
not., 15 A.L.R.3d at 992.
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Florida is in the minority of jurisdictions which have continued
to deny recovery in wrongful death when an infant is stillborn. In
the first Florida case to address the issue of prenatal tort, Stokes v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the Supreme Court denied recovery
for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus.8 5 Subsequently, in Day
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the Second District Court of
Appeal held that a child injured before birth, if it is born alive but
dies shortly thereafter, is a person for whom wrongful death recov-
ery is available."' Then in Stern v. Miller, the Florida Supreme
Court reiterated its rule that a recovery for wrongful death is de-
nied in cases where the injured fetus is stillborn.8
In Justus and Duncan, California and Florida courts addressed
the issue of whether a child who dies during the birth process is
born alive for purposes of a wrongful death suit. The plaintiff in
Justus argued that the infant was in the process of being born at
the time of death, while the plaintiff in Duncan argued that the
infant had been born alive prior to death. The Duncan argument
forced the Second District to delineate the exact criteria to estab-
lish a live birth for purposes of a wrongful death action. In so do-
ing, Duncan became the first Florida case to establish live birth
standards for a tort suit.
In addition to its legal analysis, the Second District's live birth
definition must be examined from a medical viewpoint. The two
elements of the Florida live birth standard are not well founded in
a medical sense. The first element requires that complete expul-
sion occur in order for the child to be considered born alive.88
There is very little physiological difference, however, between a vi-
able infant just prior to expulsion and a completely born infant.8
85. 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968). See note 9 supra. A cogent attack on the Florida rule with
respect to the unborn is found in Comment, The Conditional Liability Rule-A Viable Al-
ternative for the Wrongful Death of a Stillborn Child, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 187, 191-92
(1975).
86. 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
87. 348 So. 2d at 307-08.
88. 342 So. 2d at 126.
89. In general, the viable fetus shares many characteristics in connection with the com-
pletely born infant:
We know that he moves with a delightful easy grace in his buoyant world, that
foetal comfort determines foetal position. He is responsive to pain and touch and
cold and sound and light. He drinks his amniotic fluid, more if it is artifically
sweetened, less if it is given an unpleasant taste. He gets hiccups and sucks his
thumb. He wakes and sleeps. He gets bored with repetitive signals but can be
taught to be alerted by a first signal for a second different one. And finally he
determines his birthday, for unquestionably the onset of labour is a unilateral de-
cision of the foetus.
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Both are capable of growth and development if allowed to survive.
Because the complete expulsion requirement lacks any particular
significance as an indicator of viability from a medical viewpoint, it
is essentially an arbitrary standard.
The second element of live birth, i.e. separate and independent
existence, requires evidence that the umbilical cord has been cut
and that the infant has an independent circulation of blood.90 Un-
fortunately, both of these factors are inadequate as indicators of
live birth in a medical sense. First, the requirement that the umbil-
ical cord be cut means that an infant's live birth is dependent
upon the whim of the doctor. Medically, the concept .of indepen-
dent circulation has no clear meaning.91 It is true that the prenatal
and newly postnatal infant is dependent on its mother via the um-
bilical cord for oxygen and nourishment gained through circulation
of its blood at the placenta."2 And accordingly, perhaps the district
court thought that a severed umbilical cord was necessary in order
for the infant to have an independent circulation of blood. But this
assumption is incorrect. Circulation of the infant's blood through
the umbilical cord may stop before the umbilical cord is actually
cut by the doctor. For example, the infant's umbilical blood flow
often stops when the placenta is delivered or shortly after birth,
when certain internal changes occur which cause the newborn's
blood to circulate through its own lungs and to bypass the umbili-
cal connection with the mother's system.9" In both of these situa-
tions, the infant will have actually acquired an independent circu-
lation despite the fact that the umbilical cord remains unsevered.
Therefore, the cutting of the umbilical cord is an unrealistic re-
quirement for legal definitions of live birth, since the infant's inde-
pendent circulation is not necessarily contingent upon the umbili-
cal cord's severance. 4 Second, the legally espoused concept of
J. WILKE, HANDBOOK ON ABORTION 26 (1975).
As stated by the court in Chavez:
There is not much change in the child itself between a moment before and a mo-
ment after its expulsion from the body of its mother, and normally, while still
dependent on its mother, the child, for some time before it is 0born, has not only
the possibility but a strong probability of an ability to live an independent life.
176 P.2d at 94.
90. 342 So. 2d at 126.
91. Meldman, supra note 39, at 110-11.
92. See generally L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 211-20 (14th ed.
1971); Harned, Respiration and the Respiratory System, in PERINATAL PHYSIOLOGY 53 (2d
ed. 1978).
93. Id. at 173, 211-14, 371-72.
94. The person who may be responsible for the wrongful death of the infant could deter-
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independent circulation is itself without any clear meaning in a
medical sense. This lack of established medical significance renders
the district court's standard even more obscure.
Unfortunately, the continuing efforts of courts to draw a rigid
line separating the born from the unborn by focusing solely on a
variety of external signs of birth have resulted in a confusing array
of cases.
In sum, the definition chosen by the Florida Supreme Court ba-
ses recovery for the wrongful death of an infant dying in childbirth
upon factors that are not well established in either a legal or a
medical sense. Legally, the Second District's definition suffers be-
cause it adopts a high standard of proof from the criminal law and
applies it to an area of civil law. Additionally, the Second District
derives little support from the only tort case nearly on point since
in that case, the criteria of live birth were not specified. The
cases cited from the property law area provide little support for
the Second District's live birth standard: Indeed, one of the prop-
erty cases cited actually created a presumption of live birth from
the moment of conception.9
The Second District's opinion also lacks clearly established med-
ical criteria. The elements of live birth espoused by the Second
District are not founded in medical knowledge, but instead reflect
a reliance on arbitrary, external indicators of a live birth.
A more sensible definition of live birth should be developed
based on accurate medical information and a burden of proof more
natural to the civil sphere. There seems to be no reason to require
a plaintiff recovering in tort to bear as high a burden of proof as
that generally applied in criminal cases. The criteria used to define
live birth for purposes of a civil standard should be well based in
mine the type of proof required by controlling the point at which the umbilical cord is cut.
This throws a questionable light on whether the cutting of the umbilical cord should be
used as a standard to prove a separate and independent existence.
Death prior to severing the umbilical cord will generally lead to the use of expert testi-
mony to prove live birth. 342 So. 2d at 126. This will probably result in the jury choosing
between the veracity of the attending physician and of another physician called in by the
plaintiff.
95. Justus, 565 P.2d at 132-33.
96. The cases chosen by the Second District in support of its conclusion (Goff and
Wehrman) are the only two property cases dealing with the definition of live birth.
Wehrman, while adopting a standard seemingly akin to that used in murder prosecutions,
actually created a presumption of live birth in the face of evidence tending to show that the
children were born dead. See 259 N.W. at 564.
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medical fact. Development of a live birth standard along these
lines will provide needed logic to an area of great confusion.
STEVEN R. Scorr
